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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the effects of population growth, income levels, and governance 
on forestation using longitudinal data covering 161 countries from 1996-2015. The study 
begins with a review of the empirical literature on deforestation and preservation of 
environmental quality. Then, we conduct our own empirical analysis through log 
differencing and analysis of annual percentage changes in forest area. We find evidence 
that these factors matter, but that the relationships are weak. The estimated effects do differ 
between our groupings of countries with regard to income levels as well as forest area sizes. 
Population growth generally leads to a reduction in forest area. Conversely, rising incomes 
slow deforestation and increase the chances of reforestation and afforestation. We witness 
the disappearance of a Kuznets curve relationship across all groups after individual country 
effects are included. A bettering of perceived rule of law, political stability, and reduction 
in corruption is also correlated with more positive forestation rates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists, prompted by the growing concern among natural scientists, began 
studying global forest loss in the late 1970s and 1980’s. Concerns about biodiversity in 
tropical regions drove these studies. Different methodologies have been used to 
investigate the drivers of forestation. Forestation, as used throughout the paper, is a 
neutral term which refers to the change in forest area due to deforestation, reforestation, 
and afforestation. The first studies used demographic data such as population growth and 
economic growth to explain the variance in forestation both between and within 
countries. The second wave of research focused more on land-use decisions related to 
institutional and governmental policy. Some have attempted to synthesize these two main 
areas of study, but many past inquiries from the 1980’s and 1990’s suffered from 
unreliable and inconsistent data.  
Since the bulk of these studies have been conducted, the global environment has 
changed drastically. The world endured incredible political reformation following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of communism, entered into the internet age, and 
both governments and other organizations have increased the flow of information across 
great distances to larger audiences. These factors have completely changed the way we 
live our everyday lives, as well as the way we view both the environment and 
governmental responsibility. On top of previous biodiversity concerns, media sources, 
governments, and non-governmental organizations have paid increasing attention to the 
global preservation of forest lands due to their vital role in regulating climate change. 
Forests act as carbon sinks; however, when harvested or cleared they release much of 
their stored carbon into the atmosphere. An increase in the quantity and severity of 
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natural disasters thought to be influenced by the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere has amplified this attention. In response to climate threats and mounting 
worry, some governments and many NGO’s have initiated large-scale forest protection 
and reforestation acts.  
This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature examining the main drivers 
of deforestation and main factors that encourage afforestation and reforestation. To do 
this, we seek to answer three specific questions. How do the effects of population growth 
on forestation change between wealthier and poorer nations? How do forestation rates 
change based on per capita income, specifically, do forestation rates follow a U-shaped or 
S-shaped relationship with income per capita often referred to as the Environmental
Kuznets Curve? How do governance measures such as property rights security and 
political stability directly affect, and jointly with population and income variables, affect 
forestation? 
Some scholars have argued that population growth increases deforestation rates in 
tropical, temperate, and boreal forests by increasing demand for forest products, spurring 
greater agricultural land expansion and increasing rural migration (Allen and Barnes 
1985; World Bank 1992; Rosero-Bixby and Palloni 1998). “Forest conversion to large-
scale agriculture (32%) and small-scale local agriculture (26%), as measured by a 
stratified random sample of 10% of tropical forests is estimated to be the largest driver of 
deforestation globally” (FAO 2001). Developing regions frequently use resources 
inefficiently. For example, poorer nations often have open-access forest resources which 
allow migrants to occupy and deforest insecure land (Lopez 1998). Agricultural 
expansion with regards to land area is intensified in poorer countries where use of 
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irrigation, advanced mechanized farming methods, and fertilizers is low, causing lower 
crop yield (FAO 1997, 2003). Rudel (1989) found that countries with smaller rainforests 
(Burundi, Rwanda and Haiti in comparison to Brazil), were more at risk of deforestation 
due to population growth and migration of low-income farmers than countries with large 
rainforests. Similarly, Arrow et al. (1995) predicted that the effect of population growth 
on deforestation will be greater in lower income countries than in high-income countries 
due to the fact that low-income countries tend to be more agrarian compared to service-
centric economies. It is important to note that there is some opposing literature that 
examines cases in which population growth occurs concurrently with improving soil and 
water resources such as Tiffin et al. (1994) and Boyd and Slaymaker (2000). However, 
these results vary greatly between countries and sometimes within districts in a country. 
Therefore, we do not expect this to be a reliable global trend.  
A large literature explores whether environmental “bads” or disamenities worsen 
linearly with economic development, or if there is a point where environmental “bads” 
either improve or become environmental goods. This common theory regarding the 
switch from bad to better or good is called the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) and 
originally stems from Kuznets work in income inequality (Kuznets, 1995). Under this 
framework countries with relatively low GDP per capita have low deforestation rates, but 
with economic growth, these rates increase. Then, once a certain level of growth is 
achieved, deforestation slows down or even becomes reforestation. Clearly deforestation 
is not always inefficient, but in the case of rapidly deforesting countries, the clearing of 
forested areas is usually in exchange for unmechanized agriculture (Deacon 1994). This 
implies a U-shaped parabola with GDP per capital on the X-axis and a measure of 
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environmental change, in this case forestation rate, on the Y-axis. If a full reversal from 
negative forestation to positive forestation occurs, this would be an incomplete horizontal 
S-shaped graph with a zero-forestation rate being the horizontal axis1.
If environmental amenities can be usefully thought of as a normal good, we can 
expect an income effect that increases demand for environmental quality. This demand is 
often visible through governmental and institutional reform. Positive income elasticity 
holding true, poorer people may be willing to sacrifice environmental quality in exchange 
for income. For example, a typical farmer in Central America may be willing to clear a 
patch of forest if that land can be used to support his family, while a family in the United 
States may choose to preserve the foliage if offered the equivalent monetary value. There 
are several possible explanations for why the relationship between economic growth and 
forestation could be nonlinear. The World Bank’s World Development Report (1992, pg. 
39) states that, “As incomes rise the demand for improvements in environmental quality
will increase, as will the resources available for investment.” The same article affirms 
that the intensity of this phenomena depends on the strength of institutions and alignment 
of incentives to use “scarce resources sparingly” when deciding their use. Arrow et al. 
(1995) proposes that this pattern could reflect countries’ general progression from 
agrarian focused economies, to manufacturing-heavy industries, then to advanced service 
economies. In their generational long-term stock resource model of environmental 
quality, Pecchenino (1994) predicts that environmental quality degrades until it induces 
positive investment. At which point, environmental quality improves, creating a V-
1 See appendix for reference. 
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shaped graph. Others, like Suri and Chapman (1998) examine trade between high-income 
and developing countries and attribute the increase in environmental quality in wealthier 
countries to their exportation of natural resource dependent and polluting manufacturing 
processes.  
The existence and causality of these U-shaped curves has been disputed in recent 
years in part due to statistical methodology and in part due to varying results dependent 
on the measure of environmental quality. Researchers suspect that GDP per capita 
explanatory variables are endogenous to the model due to both omitted variable and 
simultaneity bias (Paudel et al. 2014). Omitted variables could be cultural or geographic 
factors that affect both environmental quality and the economy. The simultaneity bias 
arises because poor environmental quality may also reduce economic success. Arrow et 
al., (1995) point out that this nonlinear relationship has been proven somewhat valid “for 
pollutants involving local short-term costs (for example sulfur, particulates, and fecal 
coliforms), not for the accumulation of stocks of waste or for pollutants involving long-
term and more dispersed costs.” Studies including Paudel et al. (2014) have shown a non-
linear relationship between income and resource pollutants such as water quality while 
controlling for improvements in political variables. Barbier (2004) and Culas (2007) 
study deforestation and identify the presence of a U-shaped relation between GDP per 
capita and forestation rates2 while examining institutional variables and agricultural land 
expansion. However, there is conflicting evidence Koop and Tole (1999), Copeland and 
2 This is a distinction from claiming that wealthier countries will have better environmental quality compared to both themselves in 
previous time periods and other countries, as their past behavior may have greatly reduced forest area. Those with lower income levels 
may have higher deforestation rates, but at this point in time, those deforestation trends may not have had a large effect on overall 
forest area. 
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Taylor (2004), Stern (2004) suggesting that this relationship only holds when “extreme 
assumptions are made about the commonality of structure across countries.”  
Population size and income are likely connected to both the effectiveness of 
government implemented policies as well as the strength of institutions. We observe a 
clear correlation between nation wealth and the nature of institutions, but determining 
which direction causality flows between the two is unclear (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012).  
Factors influencing forestation rates are often complementary to one another 
rather than competing (Casse and Milhoj 2002). Many have conducted studies related to 
governmental policy and their related environmental outcomes. For example, Bohn and 
Deacon (2000), and Mendohlson (1994) use default risk models which demonstrate that 
weaker property rights reduce the investment rate. This reduction, in turn, increases 
deforestation rates on the basis that forest preservation is an investment that yields future 
streams of income. Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1996) demonstrate these differences 
in agriculture investment due to land titling processes. Rudel (1995) focuses on micro-
level interactions governed by informal social controls on a frontier and find that 
strengthening local populations may be the most effective control in locations with 
unrestricted areas of forest. Araujo, et al. (2011) use an instrumental variables approach 
and find that the enforceability of property rights and quality of legal institutions judged 
by number of violent conflicts and expropriation procedures is the driver of deforestation 
in the Brazilian Amazon. They bring up an earlier point made by De Soto (2000) that 
Western property law is not applicable to developing countries, further complicating 
appropriate environmental policy. The effects of direct government action, such as 
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privatizing forest lands, has been shown as a method to reduce deforestation indirectly by 
reducing corruption in the forestry industry by Koyuncu and Yilmaz (2013). Despite 
these numerous studies we have not seen a common practice emerge globally. It is 
predicted that better measures of governance will correlate with positive (or less 
negative) levels of forestation, but it is uncertain whether these measures affect 
forestation directly or are only significant when examined jointly with other factors.  
DATA 
In order to provide valuable tests that relate forestation to population, income, and 
institutional quality, we needed a clear and consistent measure of year-to-year forest area 
as well as reliable year-to-year data on population, income, and governance. In this paper 
we use forest area data as reported by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations for the years 1990-2015 in the quinquennial Forest Resources 
Assessment. Their assessment is composed from two main sources, “Country Reports 
prepared by National Correspondents and remote sensing that is conducted by FAO 
together with national focal points and regional partners.” The FAO defines Forest Land 
as “land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters and a canopy 
cover of more than 10 percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds”3 and is evaluated 
in units of 1000 hectares. This definition of forest land is a land-use definition, differing 
from other studies that only examine the presence of tree cover. Tree stands in 
agricultural systems such as fruit trees, oil palm plantations, and Christmas trees are 
excluded. However, areas that may be currently unstocked due to sustainable forestry 
3 See full definition in appendix. 
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practices and natural disaster mitigation are included if they are expected to regenerate 
within five years. This specification naturally excludes regions with sparse trees, deserts, 
and grasslands.  
These data are, of course, imperfect. The usual criticisms are that the FRA uses 
“data-poor country reports, lack of comparable long-term trend data by Mather (2005), 
Grainger (2008), Harris et al. (2012) as cited by MacDicken (2015), and assumptions that 
remotely-sensed data are inherently superior to forest statistics reported by sovereign 
nations by Grainger (2008), Harris et al. (2012), and Hansen et al. (2013) as cited by 
MacDicken (2015).” However, even with these imperfections, the FRA is the most 
complete database of forest area and related variables available4.  
GDP and population data were both drawn from The World Bank and cover years 
1995-2016. They are displayed in units of 1000’s of people and 1000’s of 2019 U.S. 
dollars throughout the paper when used as a continuous variable. This paper only 
includes countries with a population greater than 300,000 in 2016.  
All aforementioned variables are also used categorically. The study divides the 
sample into countries based on per capita GDP levels (in 2019 US$) where “High 
Income” denotes those with incomes greater than $12000, “Middle Income” between 
$2000 and $12000, and “Low Income” less than $2000. These income group 
4 The prospect of perfect, long-term forest data regarding countries that differ greatly in economic and technological resources is 
attractive, but highly impractical (MacDicken 2015).  In the 2015 edition of the FAO’s FRA they imposed a new data-quality tiered 
system. About 60% of the data reported was classified as Tier 3, the highest quality, while only about 11% was classified as Tier 1, the 
lowest quality (Keenan et al. 2015). Countries who report data of only Tier 1 quality do tend to be lower-income countries. Of the 12 
countries who reported Tier 1 quality data and had over 5 million hectares of forest area (combined only equal to 9% of global forest 
area) in 2015, 10 were in Africa. The lower quality data may be less precise than higher quality tiers, but we do not expect this to bias 
our estimates as there is no evidence that countries with less accurate data systematically report either higher or lower forest areas. 
That being acknowledged, this is still an improvement over earlier FRA reports, so the most recent reports should be seen as more 
reflective of the global forest situation than previous. Additionally, after country reports were compiled, they were each independently 
reviewed by FAO staff and other external experts and necessary adjustments were made before their incorporation into the 2015 FRA 
database (MacDicken 2015). 
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classifications use similar to the thresholds as the World Bank. We divide the sample into 
groups based on change in forest area; “High Deforestation” means a country lost 15% or 
more of their forest over the course of the study. “Low Deforestation” signifies that a 
country lost between 0-15% of total forest area over the course of the study. 
“Reforestation” classifies those who regenerated forest area. Finally, countries are sorted 
into those with over 15,000,000 hectares of forest area, marked “Large Forest Area”. 
Those with less than 15,000,000 hectares are placed in the “Smaller Forest Area” group.   
Finally, The World Governance Indicators provide several measures of perceived 
governance that cover the most countries over our course of study compared to other 
competitive measures. More importantly, there is a well-defined system by which 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (1996-2015) standardize their estimates to account for 
varying methods of reporting across regions. These indicators measure three factors titled 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption5 
which encompass different aspects of governance which may affect forestation rates. 
These values are updated every two years from 1996-2002, then annually from 2002-
current. They are aggregate indicators developed by combining over 30 individual 
sources from private sector firms, international organizations, expert reporters, think 
tanks, and in-country surveys. In order to aggregate this wide variety of data, they first 
sort each individual measure in each survey into one of their six indicators. Then, they 
are preliminarily rescaled so that each measure is put onto a 0-1 scale6. Due to the fact 
5 See definitions in appendix. 
6 In order to correct for sample biases and ensure comparability between sources, Kaufmann and Kraay subject the data to an 
Unobserved Components Model. The model assumes that the observed data from each source are linear for the signaled but 
unobserved level of governance plus error. They then weight each data point according to its correlation between data sources to more 
accurately reflect the true unobserved measure. The composite measures are normally distributed with a mean of zero, a standard 
deviation of 1, and range from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values reflecting better governance. 
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that the research database uses studies that may not encompass all reported regions, not 
every source is used for every country (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). These 
indicators are measures of perceived governance by a variety of sources. However, 
perceived governance is expected to be more accurate than measuring actual governance 
using any other source due to the widely differing strategies used to quantify governance 
and likely potential bias from within country sources.  
DEFINING FORESTATION 
𝐴",$ = 𝐹(𝐸")𝐿(𝜙",$; 𝛽) 
𝐴 is forest area for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The model assumes that forest area for each 
country is determined by a combination of environmental factors, 𝐸, such as rainfall, 
temperature, severity of seasons, and levels of socio-economic factors, 𝜙, such as 
population, income, and property rights security. 𝛽 is a parameter vector which may 
change from one time period to the next due to factors such as World Bank lending 
changes or varying time-dependent levels of global attention on deforestation among 
others (Deacon 1994). 𝐸 is assumed constant for each country over the period of the 
study for simplification although global climate change may affect each country in our 
sample differently. If environmental conditions are indeed a time independent variable, 
their effects on forestation can be removed by taking the first difference between time 
periods so that the change in forested area, CFA, is equal to: 
𝐶𝐹𝐴" = 𝑙𝑜𝑔4𝐴",$5 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔4𝐴",$785	  
𝐶𝐹𝐴" = 4𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿4𝜙",$; 𝛽$5)5 − 4𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿4𝜙",$78; 𝛽$785)5 
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If we allow the parameter vector to change between years, likely for reasons stated above, 
the model becomes: 
𝐶𝐹𝐴" = 	𝛽$𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜙",$) − 𝛽$78𝑙𝑜𝑔	(𝜙",$) 
This equation defining forestation area can be simply altered to measure forestation rate, 
FR, in each country in each year. Positive values translate as positive forestation, 
negative rates mean deforestation.  
𝐹𝑅",$ = ((𝐴",$ − 𝐴",$78)	/	𝐴",$78) ∗ 100	 
A possible model for a cross-country and time series analysis of factors on forestation 
rates looks like: 
𝐹𝑅",$ = 	𝐵@ + 𝐵8𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ",$ + 𝐵K𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ",$ +
𝐵L𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎",$ + 𝐵O𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎",$K + 𝐵P7Q𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟",$ + 𝛼" + 𝜀"$  
Here, 𝛼" is the country specific, time invariant factor that measures qualities such as 
climate, country specific traditions, soil quality, etc. These factors can of course change 
over time, but transformations of these varieties tend to be slow-developing.  
METHODOLOGY 
We examine both the annual forestation rate and the direct differences in logged 
forest area between observed time periods. Neither functional form is likely to be an 
exact representation of the relationship in our data, but both provide helpful insights. The 
annual forestation rate depicts how a change in population growth rates or income will 
affect national deforestation rates, while the direct difference in logged forest area reports 
elasticities to be interpreted as proportional changes.   
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It is probable that countries will have individual heterogeneity, and it is likely that 
the unobserved effects will also be correlated with our independent variables such as 
income per capita and population growth. This paper explores several econometric 
approaches to handling said heterogeneity bias. For our estimates of the change in annual 
percentage change in forest area, first, we use a pooled OLS estimator. This model 
imposes the restriction that a change in one explanatory variable will have the same effect 
on the change in forest area for all countries. Then, we compare those estimates to pooled 
OLS run on time-demeaned data, also known as a within or fixed-effects estimator. It is 
fairly certain that our original OLS estimates will be biased as our observations are not 
independent because we are using longitudinal data. We also run a random-effects 
estimator and compare the results to our previous fixed-effects estimator. These account 
for positive serial correlation in the error term that can make pooled the OLS standard 
errors incorrect (Woolridge 2013). The random-effects estimator differs from the fixed-
effects estimator in that it assumes 𝛼" to be uncorrelated with our other explanatory 
variables. Although these methods impose a similar assumption that all countries in our 
sample will have a common structure, the fixed-effect and random-effect estimators 
allow for these to be shifted due to individual differences. This may be reasonable as it is 
likely that countries share more in common with themselves in past years than other 
countries in the same time period. For our models with the dependent variable log change 
in forest area, the first differencing procedure should remove the bias caused by 
excluding environmental and cultural variables.  
To begin, we first run somewhat naïve regressions using population growth, 
income, and our governance indicators to establish an idea of the basic patterns. These 
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initial regressions estimate select independent variables while excluding other relevant 
factors. We assess the quality of the different estimation methods by comparing F-
Statistics, Wald-Chi Squared statistics, and using a Hausman test before dividing the 
complete set into smaller samples based on forest land area or income per capita levels. 
This division allows insight into if and/or how different factors affect countries with 
varying common characteristics.  Finally, we proceed to incorporate these variables into a 




Complete Sample High Income Low or Medium Income 
Forest Area (1000’s Hectares) 24891.1 26157.7 25299.4 
(85345.8) (74656.3) (90602.7) 
Annual Percentage Change in Forest Area -0.0559 0.460 -0.233
(1.340) (1.169) (1.368)





GDP per Capita 9755.1 31421.5 2804.1 
(15005.7) (16756.2) (2919.4) 
Annual Percentage Change in GDP per Capita 5.315 4.080 6.465 
(10.23) (4.730) (7.697) 
Population (1000’s) 39337.747 26341.499 45078.6 
(138056.6) (51923.9) (158727.5) 
Annual Percentage Change in Population 1.591 1.189 1.709 
(1.412) (1.687) (1.260) 
Rule of Law -0.125 1.174 -0.544
(1.017) (0.705) (0.642)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism -0.168 0.753 -0.461
(0.976) (0.612) (0.843)
Control of Corruption -0.110 1.206 -0.537
(1.030) (0.847) (0.614)
N 161 49 112 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses 
Table 1 shows that forest area is evenly split between high-income and 
medium/low-income countries, however the wealthier countries have a trend to reforest, 
while the less wealthy countries deforest. The mean GDP per capita of our set is 
$9755.10. One can see that lower income countries have around twice as many people as 
higher income countries and are growing more quickly. As expected, the governance 
measures are highly correlated with our measures of income, higher incomes yielding 
better governance measures.  
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Table 2 
Complete Sample Large Forest Area Smaller Forest Area 
Forest Area (1000’s 
Hectares) 24891.1 92665.0 3518.0 
(85345.8) (156141.8) (3875.9) 
Annual Percentage 
Change of Forest Area -0.0559 -0.186 -0.0147
(1.340) (0.685) (1.487)
Percentage Change in 







GDP per Capita 9755.1 9843.5 9727.1 
(15005.7) (14427.8) (15195.8) 
Annual Percentage 
Change of GDP per 
Capita 
5.315 5.302 5.320 
(10.23) (11.31) (9.868) 
Population (1000’s) 39337.7 108353.1 17573.1 
(138056.6) (266393.0) (28302.5) 
Annual Percentage 
Change of Population 1.591 1.568 1.598 
(1.412) (0.974) (1.526) 
Rule of Law -0.125 -0.206 -0.0990
(1.017) (1.117) (0.983)
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ 
Terrorism 
-0.168 -0.316 -0.122
(0.976) (0.935) (0.985) 
Control of Corruption -0.110 -0.167 -0.0919
(1.030) (1.125) (0.998)
N 161 39 122 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
When the data set is divided between countries with large forest areas versus 
countries with smaller forest areas, we see that countries with larger forest areas deforest 
a higher percentage of their forest lands. This is concerning from a global forest area and 
carbon sequestration perspective but does not mean those countries are necessarily using 
their forest lands inefficiently. Measures of GDP per capita and population growth are 
fairly even between the two samples, while the countries with smaller forest areas have 
better governance measures on average.  
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POPULATION GROWTH AND FORESTATION 
Table 3 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(OLS) 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(FE) 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(RE) 
Annual Percentage Change 




Population -0.144* -0.0736 -0.115*
(1.98) (1.05) (2.24)
Constant 
0.194 0.0391 0.153 
(1.57) (0.22) (1.12) 
F-Statistics for Significance
(P-Values)
1.53 (0.1966) 0.64 (0.6365) 
F-Statistics for Pooled
Model (P-Values) 6.8 (0.000) 
Wald Chi-Squared (P-
Values)  8.07 (0.0889) 
Hausman Statistics (P-
Value) 0.86 (0.9306) 
N 483 483 483 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 3, our first examination of the effect of population growth on annual 
forestation rate, shows that generally, when populations grow, forest areas negatively 
impacted. The row labeled ‘F-statistics for Pooled Model’ shows that we reject the null 
that individual effects, when taken together, are no different than zero. Both the fixed-
effects estimator, and the random-effects estimator are preferred over our pooled OLS 
estimates. Based on our Hausman statistic, we fail to reject the null that the unique errors 
are uncorrelated with the regressors. Therefore, it suggests the use of the random-effects 
estimator. Its results are jointly statistically significant at a confidence level of about 9%. 
The random-effects estimates of the entire data set show that a growth in population of 
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that same year leads to a decrease in annual forestation rate, but the effect is much 
stronger when we examine the population growth rate five years prior. This finding 
































-0.0219 0.0408 -0.0661 -0.217 -0.0596 -0.019






-0.115* -0.0985* -0.157 0.0321 -0.0292 -0.123*
(2.24) (2.18) (1.34) (0.21) (0.23) (2.08) 
Constant 0.153 0.382* 0.319 -0.0502 -0.0651 0.187 




8.07 (0.0889) 6.49 (0.1652) 8.72 (0.0684) 2.34 (0.6731) 0.94 (0.6238) 5.40 (.0673) 
N 483 133 179 161 116 367 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001
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Table 4 shows the use of the random-effects estimator when the data set is split 
into different groups with regard to their income-per-capita and forest areas. We see that 
for our lower income countries, the negative effects of population growth in the same 
year are more severe assuming previous growth rates held constant. Population growth 
negatively impacts annual forestation rates for both countries with large and small forest 
areas, but ceteris paribus, this effect is most intense for countries with less forest area if 
population growth occurred five years previously. It is likely that countries with less 
forest area also are smaller in size, thus an increase in population may increase 






Forest Area if 
High Income 
Log Change 




Forest Area if 
Low Income 
Log Change 









*** 0.227** -0.153* -0.269*** -0.195*** -0.172*** 
(4.76) (3.05) (2.36) (4.24) (4.03) (3.87) 
Constant 0.0137** 0.0173* 0.0187** -0.000181 0.0077 0.0159* 




22.63 (0.000) 9.29 (0.027) 5.55 (.0194) 18.01 (0.000) 16.28 (0.0001)  14.94 (0.0001) 
R-Squared 0.034 0.0546 0.0246 0.0693 0.0962 0.0298 
N 644 163 222 244 155 489 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001
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Table 5 reveals that a 1% increase in population growth yields a proportional 
.175% reduction in forest area. This result supports our previous examination on 
population growth’s effect on annual percentage changes in forest areas with the 
exception of high-income countries, where population growth is related to an increase in 
forest area. The negative effect on low-income countries is stronger than that on medium-
income countries. This finding seems to support FAO (1997, 2003) and others’ 
hypothesis that population growth drives more agrarian expansion in low-income 
countries than in wealthier ones. We do not find conclusive evidence in support of 
Rudel’s (1989) hypothesis that countries with smaller forested areas are more susceptible 
to population pressures. Regardless of how the data is split up, the coefficients of the log 
change in population are significant at least at an .05 level, however the explanatory 







Forest Area if 
High Income 
Log Change 




Forest Area if 
Low Income 
Log Change 








Population -0.0552 0.122 -0.122 -0.252 -0.089 -0.0543




-0.082 -0.0129 -0.0638 0.016 -0.0464 -0.0856
(1.96) (0.22) (0.87) (0.2) (0.81) (1.71) 
Constant 0.00902* 0.0089 0.0170** -0.00345 0.00208 0.0111* 




7.43 (0.0007) 2.88 (0.0595) 4.06 (0.0189) 1.49 (0.2277) 16.28 (0.0001) 14.94 (0.0001) 
R-Squared 0.037 0.0425 0.0441 0.0186 0.0507 0.029 
N 483 133 179 161 116 367 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001
When the lagged log change in population value is included, the signs of our 
coefficients and the rankings of magnitude remain the same but are no longer significant 
at a .05 level. When both the log change in population and lagged log change in 
population variables are included, the coefficients are interpreted as if the other is held 
constant. In this case a 1% increase in population in the same year yields a proportional 
.0552% reduction in forest area, while a 5-year previous 1% increase in population 
reduces forest area by .082%.  
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INCOME AND FORESTATION 
Table 7 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(OLS) Annual Forestation Rate (FE) 
Annual Forestation 
Rate (RE) 
GDP per capita ($1000s) .0481*** -0.0178 0.0269** 
(4.25) (1.17) (2.84) 
GDP per capita-squared -0.000523*** 0.0000852 -0.000282* 
(3.69) (0.53) (2.26)
Constant -.377*** 0.106 -0.236* 
(3.11) (0.9) (2.18)
F-Statistics for
Significance (P-Values) 9.36 (0.0001) 1.3 (0.2732) 
F-Statistics for Pooled
Model (P-Values) 7.02 (0.000) 
Wald Chi-Squared (P-
Values) 8.34 (0.0154) 
Hausman Statistic (P-
Values) 14.13 (0.0009) 
Kuznets? No Yes No 
Turning Point $104,460.09 
N 629 629 629 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 7 depicts ambiguous results depending on the model. Using the fixed-
effects model7, and thus incorporating the individual country specific effects under the 
assumption that these effects are correlated with GDP per capita, we see that the 
relationship between annual forestation rate and GDP per capita, although insignificant, 
does imply an U-shaped relationship. This is noted in the row labeled ‘Kuznets?’. 
However, the turning point GDP per capita value is much higher than almost all countries 
studied. 
7 The ‘F-Statistics for Pooled Model’ and the ‘Wald Chi-Squared’ statistic test for the model’s validity against the OLS regression. In this case the OLS
estimates are thought to be biased. The Hausman statistic compares the fixed-effects estimator against the random-effects estimator and in this case, we 
reject the null in favor of the fixed-effects estimator.  
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When the sample is divided into countries based on income groups and forest 
areas, only the countries with high incomes exhibit a significant Kuznets curve 
relationship. However, the turning point of $67,280.45 per capita is greater than the 
current GDP per capita of most countries in the sample. For medium-income and small-
forest area countries, the Kuznets relationship is insignificant, while low-income and 






























-0.0178 -0.0475** -0.0383 0.296 -0.00331 -0.0226
(1.17) (2.86) (0.28) (0.39) (0.15) (1.19) 
GDP per 
capita-squared 0.0000852 0.000353
* 0.00415 -0.166 -0.000000496 0.000115 
(0.53) (2.18) (0.41) (0.45) (0.001) (0.6) 
Constant 0.106 1.531*** 0.182 -0.652* -0.152 0.186 








7.02 (0.000) 8.80 (0.000) 4.22 (0.000) 4.13 (0.000) 7.54 (0.000) 6.8 (0.000) 
Kuznets? Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Turning Point $104,460.09 $67,280.45 $4,614.45 $98,260.86 
N 629 163 222 244 479 150 
t statistics in parentheses 








Forest Area if 
High Income 
Log Change 




Forest Area if 
Low Income 
Log Change 










0.0308*** 0.0517 0.0218 0.0331** 0.0142 0.0354*** 
(3.7) (1.77) (1.81) (2.67) (1.48) (3.4) 
Constant -0.0124** 0.0214* -0.00144 -0.0456*** -0.0159** -0.0110* 




13.66 (0.002) 3.15 (.0780) 3.26 (0.0723) 7.12 (0.0082) 2.2 (0.1401) 11.56 (0.0007) 
R-Squared 0.0213 0.0192 0.0146 0.029 0.0146 0.0237 
N 630 163 222 240 151 479 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001
Rather than examining levels of GDP per capita, our log differenced model looks 
at the impacts of a change in income. A 1% increase in GDP per capita reflects a 
proportional .031% increase in forested area. Across all groups, increasing GDP per 
capita growth has positive effects on changes in forested area. These effects are stronger 
for countries with smaller forest areas. The explanatory power of this model remains low, 
but the F-Statistics show that most samples examined are jointly significant.  
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GOVERNANCE AND FORESTATION 
 Table 10 
High Deforestation Low Deforestation Reforestation 
Rule of Law -0.79 -0.339 0.366 
(0.621) (0.939) (0.989) 
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/ Terrorism 
-0.659 -0.291 0.177 
(0.854) (0.961) (0.916) 
Control of Corruption -0.76 -0.313 0.367 
(0.555) (0.938) (1.052) 
N 148 208 288 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses 
Table 10 presents summary statistics for our governance indicator variables. The 
mean values of each are compared across groups of countries which exhibit different 
forestation behaviors. As expected, the values for highly deforesting countries are lower than 
those who deforest less, and much lower than those who reforest.  This comparison of values 
seems to support previous studies like Bohn and Deacon (2000) and Mendohlson (1994) 
which argue that preserving forests is an act of investment, so is more likely to occur under 
regimes with strong property rights and effective enforcing institutions.  
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Table 11 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(OLS) 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(FE) 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(RE) 
Rule of Law 0.222 0.262 0.301 
(0.66) (1.11) (1.62) 
Control of Corruption 0.107 -0.182 -0.0543
(0.35) (0.82) (0.31)
Policital Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ 
Terrorism 
0.0752 0.217* 0.162
(0.61) (2.02) (1.79) 
Constant -0.0108 -0.0105 0.00471 
(0.11) (0.26) (0.05) 
F-Statistics for Significance
(P-Values) 8.23 (0.00) 2.69 (0.0459) 
F-Statistics for Pooled
Model (P-Values) 7.31 (0.000) 
Wald Chi-Squared (P-
Values) 25.39 (0.000) 
Hausman P-Value 1.62 (.6548) 
N 626 626 626 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 11 shows the results of a simplistic regression of our governance indicators 
on annual forestation rates. The majority of the coefficients are individually insignificant 
at a .05 level, but still demonstrate that better governance raises the annual forestation 
rate. The individual significance takes a second seat to the joint significance as these 
variables are highly correlated. For instance, better control of corruption leads to stronger 
rule of law, and strengthening the rule of law allows for more political stability etc. We 
ran significance tests for combinations of these indicator variables and F-tests suggest for 
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each combination they remain strongly jointly significant. Again, the fixed-effects and 
random-effects estimates are thought to be more accurate than the pooled OLS estimates. 
SYNTHESIS 
Table 12 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(OLS) 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(FE) 
Annual Forestation Rate 
(RE) 
Annual Percentage Change 
in Population 0.0212 -0.0162 -0.0108





(1.68) (1.17) (1.58)  
GDP per Capita 0.0188 0.0108 0.0168
(1.3) (0.41) (1.1)  
GDP per Capita Squared -0.00025 -0.00000695 -0.000157
(1.81) (0.03) (0.94)  
Rule of Law 0.0515 0.0621 0.128
(0.13) (0.19) (0.54)  
Control of Corruption 0.14 -0.158 -0.00639
(0.41) (0.56) (0.03)  
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ 
Terrorism 
0.0343 0.0463 0.0424 
(0.25) (0.32) (0.39) 
Constant -0.0278 -0.0378 -0.0231
(0.16) (0.12) (0.12) 
F-Statistics for Significance
(P-Values) 3.01 (0.0054) 0.38 (.9165) 
F-Statistics for Pooled
Model (P-Values) 6.39 (0.000) 
Wald Chi-Squared (P-
Values) 17.37 (.0152) 
Hausman P-Value 2.24 (.9451) 
Kuznets? No No No 
N 466 466 466 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 12 is a beginning synthesis including population growth, GDP per capita 
levels, and our governance indicators. The governance measures examine our three 
separate measures that are all useful as proxies for overall governmental quality. After 
examining our tests of pooled-model significance and our Hausman Statistic, the random-
effects estimates are favored. The coefficients follow the trends of our original naïve 
regressions in that population growth is correlated with deforestation while income 
growth is correlated with reforestation. The Kuznets relationship disappears in our 
synthesis model. This result supports Koop and Tole (1999), Copeland and Taylor 
(2004), Stern (2004) that the relationship is only apparent under strict commonality 
assumptions. As expected, a bettering in our governance indicators, especially Rule of 
Law, increases forestation rates.  
Tables 13 and 14 respectively divide our synthesis model into countries based on 
income levels and forest areas. When the sample is split into income groups, we observe 
same trends noted above. Immediately the results hint that low-income countries may 
exhibit a Kuznets curve relationship, but jointly our independent variables are 
insignificant for that group. Countries with large forest areas display an unexpected result 
with regards to our governance indicators. Improving property rights, measured by our 
‘Rule of Law’ variable improves the annual forestation rate. Conversely, bettering 
‘Control of Corruption’ worsens forestation rates. The explanation for why this may be is 
uncertain as it directly conflicts with Koyuncu and Yilmaz’s (2013) findings. It is 
possible that in countries with larger sized forest areas, the corruptive powers hold 







Rate if High 
Income 
Annual Forestation 
Rate if Medium 
Income 
Annual Forestation 




-0.0108 0.0389 -0.0472 -0.245





-0.0857 -0.0927* -0.139 0.0317 
(1.58) (2.02) (1.19) (0.19) 
GDP per Capita 
($1000s) 0.0168 0.0156 0.079 -0.846
(1.1) (0.9) (0.5) (0.82) 
GDP per Capita-
squared -0.000157 -0.000114 -0.00427 0.357 
(0.94) (0.72) (0.38) (0.74) 
Rule of Law 0.128 0.124 0.0751 0.447 
(0.54) (0.42) (0.21) (0.89) 
Control of 
Corruption -0.00639 0.0319 0.0392 0.0339 
(0.03) (0.14) (0.12) (0.07) 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/ 
Terrorism 
0.0424 0.0419 0.142 -0.123
(0.39) (0.22) (0.88) (0.58) 
Constant -0.0231 -0.19 0.12 0.657 
(0.12) (0.56) (0.24) (0.87) 
Wald Chi-Squared 
(P-Values) 17.37 (0.0152) 11.17 (.1313) 10.42 (.1662) 4.15 (.7620) 
Kuznets? No No No Yes 
Turning Point $1184.87 
N 466 133 175 158 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 14 
Random Effects Annual Forestation Rate 
Annual Forestation Rate if 
High Forest Area 
Annual Forestation Rate if 
Low Forest Area 
Annual Percentage Change 







(1.58) (0.38) (1.48) 
  
GDP per Capita 
($1000’s) 0.0168 0.0288 0.02 
(1.1) (1.35) (1.05)   
GDP per Capita- 
Squared -0.000157 -0.000356 -0.000192
(0.94) (1.13) (0.96)
  
Rule of Law 0.128 0.680** -0.0133
(0.54) (2.88) (0.04)
  
Control of Corruption -0.00639 -0.524* 0.148 
(0.03) (2.54) (0.55) 
  
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ 
Terrorism 
0.0424 -0.162 0.0658 
(0.39) (1.45) (0.48) 
Constant -0.0231 -0.486 0.00517 
(0.12) (1.70) (0.02) 
Wald Chi-Squared (P-
Values) 17.37 (.0152) 17.15 (0.0165) 14.30 (0.0461) 
Kuznets? No No No 
N 466 112 354 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 15 investigates the effects of both changes in population and in GDP per 
capita. These results underline previous results showing that a growth in population is, in 
general, harmful to changes in forested area, while a growth in GDP per capita is 
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beneficial. If growth in both population and GDP per capita were to happen concurrently 
they would partially offset each other, except for in the wealthiest countries. Even though 
most of the variation across countries is not accounted for by the included variables, the 
significance of most variables at least at a .05 level, and its concurrence with previous 
estimates increase the reliability of the results.  
Table 16 includes our governance variables in the synthesis log differences 
regression. Most of the governance variables are insignificant individually, except for 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption in countries with large forest areas. The 
coefficient values for population growth and GDP per capita growth change by a small 






Forest Area if 
High Income 
Log Change 




Forest Area if 
Low Income 
Log Change 









*** 0.222** -0.135* -0.250*** -0.190*** -0.149** 




0.0245** 0.0484 0.017 0.0255* 0.0104 0.0285** 
(2.92) (1.7) (1.39) (2.09) (1.13) (2.71) 
Constant 0.00494 0.00699 0.0102 -0.00907 0.00419 0.0055 




15.63 (0.000) 6.15 (0.0027) 3.76 (0.0248) 11.37 (0.000) 8.59 (0.0003) 11.18 (0.000) 
R-Squared 0.0475 0.0713 0.0332 0.0876 0.104 0.0449 
N 630 163 222 240 151 479 
t statistics in parentheses 








 Forest Area 
 if High Income 
Log Change 
Forest Area 
if Medium Income 
Log Change 
Forest Area 
if Low Income 
Log Change 
Forest Area 








* 0.251** -0.122 -0.252*** -0.0941 -0.0795




0.0263** 0.0553 0.0142 0.0236 0.0173* 0.0294** 
(3.15) (1.90) (1.13) (1.90) (1.13) (2.71) 
Rule of Law 0.0101 0.0320 -0.00477 0.00901 0.0545*** 0.000667 
(0.81) (1.00) (0.28) (0.40) (3.92) (0.04) 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/  
Terrorism 
0.00462 -0.0111 0.0107 -0.0000460 0.00235 0.00323 
(0.77) (0.76) (1.24) (0.00) (0.37) (0.43) 
Control of Corruption 0.0107 -0.0138 0.00958 0.0275 -0.0405** 0.0241 
(0.90) (0.52) (0.59) (1.11) (3.12) (1.64) 
Constant -0.000964 -0.00902 0.0131 0.0198 -0.00339 0.0000012 




15.22 (0.00) 2.85 (0.0171) 2.37 (0.0402) 5.98 (0.000) 10.55 (0.000) 11.29 (0.000) 
R-Squared 0.1108 0.0833 0.0530 0. 0969 0.2680 0.1091 
N 617 163 218 233 150 467 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
To test whether the main findings are robust to changes in the econometric 
specifications, we considered the following. First, we added some additional variables 
that plausibly could affect forestation, including population density and percentage of 
total population which lives in urban areas. The direct values of these variables as well as 
the change in values of these variables between time periods were examined. Second, we 
analyzed their effects on forestation and the coefficients of our other predictors using 
both naïve regressions and by incorporating them into our synthesis model. 
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When included in a naïve regression using logged difference in forest areas, 
population density is statistically significant. The model predicts that an increase of 10 
people per square kilometer yields a proportional .000465% reduction in forest area. 
Conversely, percentage of total population living in an urban area appears insignificant. 
When added to the regression portrayed in Table 16, neither population density nor urban 
population percentage is significant. Additionally, the inclusion of these variables does 
not alter the values of our previous coefficients meaningfully. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This paper sought to provide updated descriptive statistical results for use in 
comparison with previous studies which examined the drivers of forestation. To do so, 
we examined both direct logged differences in forest areas as well as annual forestation 
rates in 161 countries from the years 1996-2015. Our results support previous studies that 
current and prior population growth increases forest loss, while improving GDP per 
capita increases preservation and reforestation. We did not find that countries follow a 
traditional Kuznets curve after individual country effects included. Improving governance 
measures, specifically strengthening property rights, lessening corruption, and 
maintaining political stability, are beneficial for forest preservation. Although 
Mendelsohn (1994) warns that deforestation will only cease when forests are more 
valuable than other land uses, he also concludes that secure property rights are a step 
towards “prudent management of the world’s scarce resources.”  
We find evidence that institutional quality matters when predicting forestation. 
Our governance indicators are jointly significant, but it is difficult to separate the 
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individual effects as they are highly correlated with one another. Additionally, measures 
of governance do trend closely with incomes. Wealthier countries often have stronger 
institutions and more reliable governments, but it is uncertain which direction causality 
flows. The division of countries into groups based on income levels and forest area size 
provides additional insight into their heterogeneity. We discover different estimated 
effects of a change in all of our independent variables depending on income level as well 
are forest area size. We attribute this mainly to the income effect for environmental 
quality as well as the different spatial challenges regarding enforcement of regulation that 
accompany large forests.  
It is clear for both research and for future policy that continually improving forest 
data will ensure greater accuracy in these studies, especially in lower-income areas of the 
world. Moreover, these assessments should be continually updated to keep close track of 
in the moment trends to provide proactive solutions rather than purely reactive ones. This 
study was based on just one measure of forest area, the FAO’s land-use definition, but 
depending on research goals, a narrowing or expansion on the definition of forest area, 
e.g., biomass, forest area including grasslands and foliage used in certain types of
farming, distinguishing between primary tropical forest and regenerated temperate forest, 
may be more applicable. Forests’ role in greater environmental policy is multifaceted due 
to their ability to sequester carbon, provide havens of biodiversity, provide medicines and 
crops of the future, and return sustainable forest goods. Likewise, however, the threats to 
forest areas are complex. Moreover, the drivers of forestation are likely “determined 
endogenously” so the “unraveling of the chain of causation” is central to any policy 
aimed at affecting forestation (Deacon 1994). This leads to belief that the most effective 
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environmental policies will likely take on a portfolio approach of conservation of existing 
areas, regeneration of degraded areas, and promoting sustainable land uses.  
APPENDIX 
Forest Area: “land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters and a canopy cover of 
more than 10 percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds. Excludes land that is predominantly under 
agricultural or urban land use, and land that is predominantly used for maintenance and restoration of 
environmental function… Forest land is determined both by presence of trees and by the absence of other 
predominant land uses. The trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 meters in situ. Includes 
areas with young trees that have not yet reached but that are expected to reach a canopy cover of 10 percent 
and tree height of 5 meters. It also includes areas that are temporarily unstocked owing to clear-cutting as 
part of a forest management practice or natural disasters, and that are expected to regenerate within five 
years. Local conditions may, in exceptional cases, justify the use of a longer time frame. Includes forest 
roads, firebreaks, and other small open areas. May include forest land in national parks, nature reserves, 
and other protected areas, such as those of specific environmental, scientific, historical, cultural, or spiritual 
interest. Includes windbreaks, shelter belts, and corridors of trees with an areas of more than 0.5 hectares 
and width of more than 20 meters. Includes abandoned shifting cultivation land with a regeneration of trees 
that have, or is expected to reach a canopy cover of 10 percent and tree height of 5 meters. Includes areas 
with mangroves in tidal zones regardless of whether this area is classified as land area or not. Includes areas 
with bamboo and palms provided that land use, height and canopy cover criteria are met. Some agroforesty 
systems such as the taungya system, where crops are grown only during the first years of the forest rotation 
should be classified as forest. Excludes: tree stands in agricultural production systems, such as fruit-tree 
plantations, oil palm plantations, rubber and Christmas trees, and agroforestry systems when crops are 
grown under tree cover.” Measured in 1000’s of hectares. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/GF 
Population: Measured in 1000’s of people 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
GDP: Measured in 1000’s of 2019 US dollars 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
GDP Per Capita: GDP/Population 
Population Density: People per square km of land area 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST 
Urban Population: Percent of total population living in an urban area 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS 
Annual Percentage Change Variables: = ((𝑋",$ − 𝑋",$78)	/	𝑋",$78) ∗ 100 
Rule of Law: “Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
Control of Corruption: “Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
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state by elites and private interests.” 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism: Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 




Forest Area > 15000000 
Hectares 
High-Income Medium-Income Low-Income 
 
Argentina Angola Cameroon 
Australia Bolivia Central African Republic 
Canada Brazil Congo 
Chile China Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Finland Colombia India 
France Gabon Mozambique 
Japan Guyana Myanmar 
Spain Indonesia Sudan 
Sweden Lao PDR Tanzania 
United States Malaysia Zambia 
Venezuela, RB Mexico Zimbabwe  







Forest Area < 15000000 
Hectares 
High-Income Medium-Income Low-Income 
 
Austria Albania Afghanistan 
Bahamas Algeria Bangladesh 
Bahrain Armenia Benin 




Cyprus Belize Cambodia 
Denmark Bhutan Chad 
Estonia Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Comoros 
Germany Botswana Djibouti 
Greece Bulgaria Ethiopia 
Hungary Costa Rica Gambia 
Iceland Croatia Ghana 




Italy Ecuador Haiti 
Kuwait Egypt Kenya 
Latvia El Salvador Kyrgyzstan 
Lithuania Equatorial Guinea Lesotho 
Luxembourg Fiji Liberia 
Malta Georgia Madagascar 
Netherlands Guatemala Malawi 
New Zealand Honduras Mali 
Norway Iran Mauritania 
Oman Iraq Nepal 
Panama Jamaica Niger 
Poland Jordan Pakistan 
Portugal Kazakhstan Rwanda 
Puerto Rico Lebanon Senegal 
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Saudi Arabia Libya Sierra Leone 
Singapore Maldives Somalia 
Slovakia Mauritius South Sudan 
Slovenia Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic 
South Korea Montenegro Tajikistan 







United Kingdom Nigeria 















Argentina Afghanistan Algeria Romania 
Belize Albania Austria Russian Federation 
Benin Angola Azerbaijan Rwanda 
Botswana Armenia Bahrain Slovakia 
Burkina Faso Australia Belarus Slovenia 
Cambodia Bahamas Belgium Spain 
Cameroon Bangladesh Bhutan Sweden 
Chad Bolivia Bulgaria Switzerland 
Comoros Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Chile Syrian Arab Republic 
South Korea Brazil China Tajikistan 
El Salvador Brunei Darussalam Costa Rica Thailand 
Equatorial Guinea Burundi Croatia Tunisia 
Ethiopia Canada Cuba Turkey 
Guatemala Central African 
Republic 
Cyprus Ukraine 
Haiti Colombia Denmark United Arab Emirates 
Honduras Congo Dominican Republic United Kingdom 
Indonesia Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
Egypt United States 
Kyrgyzstan Djibouti Estonia Uruguay 
Liberia Ecuador Fiji Uzbekistan 
Malawi Guinea Finland Vietnam 
Mali Guinea-Bissau France 
 
Mauritania Guyana Gabon 
Myanmar Jamaica Gambia 
Namibia Jordan Georgia 
Nepal Kazakhstan Germany 
Nicaragua Kenya Ghana 
Niger Libya Greece 
Nigeria Madagascar Hungary 
Pakistan Malaysia Iceland 
Paraguay Maldives India 
Somalia Mauritius Iran 
Sudan Mexico Iraq 
Tanzania Mozambique Ireland 
Timor-Leste Norway Israel 
Togo Oman Italy 
Uganda Panama Japan 
Zimbabwe Papua New Guinea Kuwait  
Peru Lao PDR 
Portugal Latvia 
Saudi Arabia Lebanon 
Senegal Lesotho 
Sierra Leone Lithuania 
Singapore Luxembourg 
South Africa Malta 
South Sudan Mongolia 
Sri Lanka Montenegro 
Suriname Morocco 
Trinidad and Tobago Netherlands 
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Turkmenistan New Zealand 
Venezuela, RB Philippines 
Yemen Poland 



















Afghanistan 590.0765 0.2743922 -0.1310353 -0.0465902
Albania 617.2304 3952.831 0.6805531 0.8841076 0.3782352 
Algeria 2394.42 4162.852 0.3428156 0.34185 0.2750315 
Angola 922.5501 4170.731 0.5813732 1.534685 0.1279316 
Argentina 4318.775 13698.29 -0.6208894 -0.0845734 -0.3549264
Armenia 637.8557 3617.936 0.0907152 0.4312557 0.225724 
Australia 18214.84 56644.04 0.0738213 -0.4495726 -0.0411556
Austria 21680.99 44176.67 0.0128917 0.3192526 -0.2899529
Azerbaijan 1266.021 5500.31 0.4762866 0.1006286 0.370656 
Bahamas 12350.98 30483.82 -0.7196963 -0.3726216 -0.2125545
Bahrain 8528.983 22688.88 0.126598 -1.129314 -0.2421469
Bangladesh 297.568 1210.159 0.1604128 -0.4875087 0.3003679 
Belarus 2124.84 5949.106 0.3208702 0 0.0483848 
Belgium 20710.64 40431.95 0.1233938 -0.5432821 0.07651 
Belize 2197.185 4905.537 -0.8509462 -0.1397851 -0.0414144
Benin 393.6862 783.9631 -0.378562 -0.8119107 -0.0871599
Bhutan 557.9722 2616.01 0.3888814 0.4840753 0.0346277 
Bolivia 709.9488 3077.026 -0.7535415 -0.0329324 -0.2361522
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4584.243 0.3307984 0.1240077 0.1672694 
Botswana 2750.95 6521.146 0.0007639 -0.0308607 0.0184484 
Brazil 3093.038 8750.222 0.0613788 -0.5181978 -0.4366821
Brunei Darussalam 13604.16 30967.89 -0.1299799 -0.0595924 0.1998174 
Bulgaria 2366.53 6993.783 0.0240047 -0.3626332 -0.1313106
Burkina Faso 351.9793 575.3145 0.0933203 -0.6703568 -0.2124309
Burundi 209.0516 304.3742 0.1874633 0.0756481 -0.4382077
Cambodia 1163.19 0.080656 0.8405814 -0.1595994
Cameroon 951.8883 1353.924 0.2234787 -0.4267792 0.1180636 
Canada 21371.29 43327.17 0.1476878 0.1062319 -0.228985
Central African Republic -0.4041191 0 -0.131411
Chad 291.8662 781.3311 -0.0915051 0.1613898 -0.2574654
Chile 2500.646 13736.64 0.0213802 -0.053527 -0.3060505
China 317.8847 8069.213 0.1173662 -0.3413606 -0.0638098
Colombia 1396.029 6085.21 0.6212614 0.5345342 0.0985885 
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Comoros 1043.801 1271.057 0.4759959 -0.2546613 0.3870574 
Congo 1146.812 1712.121 0.3374799 0.3940077 -0.074169
Costa Rica 1844.863 11393.03 -0.1297324 -0.1891333 -0.1244875
Croatia 11773.26 0.1695742 0.312602 0.317784 
Cuba 2706.976 7602.279 0.3405086 0.3964084 -0.3069449
Cyprus 7293.28 16951.66 -0.0000114 0.0353964 -0.1138271
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 
6516.305 27105.08 0.0511388 -0.2370481 0.0509961 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
270.1106 497.6298 0.3328753 0.3256967 0.2637575 
Denmark 26891.44 53254.85 0.203644 -0.6056606 -0.1837111
Djibouti 766.1409 1761.61 -0.0358604 -0.2016989 0.2887745 
Dominican Republic 984.6914 6534.909 0.0976536 0.2208679 -0.0970211
Ecuador 1491.402 6150.156 -0.3885139 0.4301866 0.2229962 
Egypt 748.6023 3547.713 -0.5833038 -1.549755 -0.0890617
El Salvador 916.7567 3669.879 0.1547925 -0.3491613 0.0914313 
Equatorial Guinea 262.6695 11213.48 -0.0374911 -0.1642109 -0.2193624
Estonia 17412.45 0.6782535 -0.2796719 0.4542668 
Ethiopia 253.193 645.465 0.4202958 -0.5542265 0.0006087 
Fiji 1834.99 4889.462 0.0156471 0.2801555 -0.1436682
Finland 28380.55 42494.66 0.0785847 -0.6807855 -0.1677957
France 21690.63 36613.38 -0.0460855 -0.6803097 -0.0626053
Gabon 6251.018 7448.716 -0.3441222 -0.6153347 -0.0026323
Gambia 345.8558 704.9741 -0.5172762 -0.513595 -0.382963
Georgia 1614.64 3756.378 1.204759 0.3472104 1.687782 
Germany 22219.57 41394.66 0.1571263 -0.7131249 -0.0231977
Ghana 402.5889 1783.061 -0.0125563 0.3277444 -0.0968364
Greece 9600.185 18167.77 -0.6165673 -1.038986 -0.7358942
Guatemala 825.8074 3923.573 -0.0658066 0.1129504 0.0208356 
Guinea 441.4128 727.3025 0.2279369 1.522689 -0.0385793
Guinea-Bissau 241.0025 591.8062 0.0315531 -0.1682725 -0.3786843
Guyana 533.5362 4160.265 -0.0533486 0.3488216 -0.2398848
Haiti 436.1136 814.5464 0.2827579 -0.0414777 0.0057243 
Honduras 993.478 2341.275 0.0630164 -0.3903738 0.3881992 
Hungary 12503.68 -0.506198 -0.170866 -0.639045
Iceland 25008.85 52428.6 -0.1593684 -0.267774 -0.3281795
India 368.8848 1606.953 -0.3775331 0.0496362 -0.0064573
Indonesia 585.0011 3334.549 0.2952441 1.381059 0.4607178 
Iran 2219.842 4862.3 -0.4159789 -0.1993751 -0.2033464
Iraq 10297.43 4914.728 -0.0296024 -0.5244091 0.1317245 
Ireland 14048.11 61908.79 0.2073034 -0.6771151 0.1825856 
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Israel 12658.15 35855.27 0.1375302 -0.0532668 -0.1103383
Italy 20757.09 30170.52 -0.5855449 -0.5421516 -0.7128887
Jamaica 1894.293 4925.416 0.1720217 -0.0902941 -0.2577051
Japan 25359.35 34567.75 0.2029774 -0.1337769 0.2951959 
Jordan 1168.349 4096.099 0.0703244 -0.6064621 0.1762743 
Kazakhstan 1647.463 10510.77 0.6680815 -0.1257681 0.2713436 
Kenya 366.3009 1355.055 0.3846631 -0.1761558 0.0474015 
Kuwait 8776.741 29109.07 -0.5716999 -0.9657716 -0.8156893
Kyrgyzstan 609.1729 1121.083 -0.1181648 -0.6992404 -0.2465679
Lao PDR 203.256 2159.433 0.1894057 1.120425 -0.0256082
Latvia 13639.69 0.5972629 0.0275545 0.5403876 
Lebanon 1050.118 8529.513 -0.6603574 -1.263847 -0.3410231
Lesotho 371.8442 1154.355 -0.3158742 -0.4035146 0.0717652 
Liberia 706.0595 1.144015 1.133919 0.8475857 
Libya 6514.321 4465.49 -0.6397546 -1.899634 -0.7495794
Lithuania 14291.91 0.7159725 0.3352448 0.2602176 
Luxembourg 34645.15 100428.4 0.0292896 -0.1667362 0.0482221 
Madagascar 265.6761 402.0883 -0.4427088 -0.5879866 -0.3982779
Malawi 199.2859 362.6582 0.1704921 0.3589552 -0.4902951
Malaysia 2440.592 9655.138 0.2288138 0.1647676 -0.1019447
Maldives 963.5956 9821.691 -0.6443148 -0.7586983 -0.0978499
Mali 316.8166 749.918 -0.3875969 -1.925552 0.1538084 
Malta 7191.924 23715.53 -0.2551247 -0.5229726 -0.0571032
Mauritania 502.2318 1158.256 -0.4424511 -0.9820089 -0.469558
Mauritius 2506.179 9260.448 -0.127984 0.241886 -0.0829422
Mexico 3060.685 9298.244 -0.0644786 -0.6005339 -0.5202909
Mongolia 1172.443 3946.962 -0.3736253 -0.1071369 -0.181825
Montenegro 6514.273 -0.2834197 0.1407977 0.0397436 
Morocco 1213.069 2907.188 -0.2182577 -0.2758926 -0.1106018
Mozambique 189.6245 528.313 -0.1214007 -0.3888497 -0.3177779
Myanmar 1138.993 0.1874025 0.5092305 0.5514502 
Namibia 1969.167 4803.283 -0.0314299 0.9873396 -0.2614917
Nepal 193.4761 747.1604 -0.423954 0.1670813 0.0886492 
Netherlands 21019.12 45175.23 0.1701648 -0.8339831 -0.3223571
New Zealand 13670.2 38649.38 0.1760882 0.1631416 0.0238285 
Nicaragua 243.5613 2073.498 0.1551228 -0.0226243 0.1212136 
Niger 309.5865 362.7522 0.1440276 -1.191339 0.2405193 
Nigeria 567.1859 2729.763 0.1377978 -0.4692993 0.1349664 
Norway 28242.94 74521.57 0.1501065 -0.3722035 0.051198 
Oman 6448.132 16410.61 -0.1811686 -0.3391783 -0.5286098
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Pakistan 371.5726 1428.638 0.1620786 -1.379676 0.0303003 
Panama 2603.781 13627.69 0.0454791 0.1331233 -0.0492023
Papua New Guinea 746.5074 2605.946 -0.0248966 -0.2117799 -0.1074625
Paraguay 1379.324 5447.119 0.3205161 1.009516 0.4327772 
Peru 1210.006 6053.113 0.2042643 0.5911598 -0.1408247
Philippines 715.3106 2878.338 0.0323454 0.5332677 0.0570351 
Poland 1731.21 12556.36 0.0878825 0.5657262 -0.0413225
Portugal 7885.394 19252.63 -0.0788862 -0.4798861 -0.2253895
Puerto Rico 8652.508 29764.06 -0.2465391 0.5937448 -0.8094644
Romania 1680.706 8977.499 0.3624702 0.5715001 0.4736389 
Russian Federation 3485.112 9463.809 0.333922 0.3674365 0.0461076 
Rwanda 352.4401 711.774 1.273567 1.706062 1.238542 
Saudi Arabia 7204.729 20732.86 0.2685056 -0.8529071 0.2418042 
Senegal 957.8437 1186.327 -0.175172 0.4740584 0.1369713 
Sierra Leone 150.6512 582.9362 0.5330521 1.766608 0.0951771 
Singapore 11864.28 54940.86 0.5149704 0.1704745 -0.115859
Slovakia 2395.565 16182.3 0.1614578 0.2126947 -0.0479507
Slovenia 20873.16 -0.0611973 0.0674397 -0.1118069
Somalia 478.7848 -0.0249715 -0.4314797 -0.0464252
South Africa 3076.455 5742.988 -0.1137391 0.0124917 -0.5928316
South Sudan 917.9214 -1.85548 -2.375689 -1.687486
Spain 13767.38 25817.39 -0.532804 -0.2107701 -0.791097
Sri Lanka 463.5132 3844.514 -0.1149738 1.995154 -0.1611471
Sudan 615.8875 2513.885 0.38846 0.0817821 -0.6203782
Suriname 953.1943 8617.762 -0.1726626 0.0462747 -0.716935
Sweden 30162.32 50832.55 0.2076782 -0.4457919 -0.0557289
Switzerland 38428.39 82081.6 -0.0317023 -0.2401881 0.0218947 
Syrian Arab Republic 988.9486 -0.9290832 -2.795851 -0.5195997
Tajikistan 497.6401 918.8119 0.3348739 0.7661246 0.1496021 
Tanzania 167.2745 879.3362 -0.0248889 0.2860325 0.1230894 
Thailand 1508.286 5846.395 -0.728817 -1.449741 -0.3064004
Timor-Leste 2501.577 -1.413793 -0.7088967 -0.5216166
Togo 430.0115 563.4754 -0.0971676 0.0630477 0.0346184 
Trinidad and Tobago 4147.639 17941.24 -0.57028 0.1335411 -0.5412604
Tunisia 1492.879 3827.73 0.154265 -1.284895 0.1589935 
Turkey 2794.353 10984.8 -0.1012248 -0.6937157 0.04284 
Turkmenistan 865.7897 6432.684 -0.0894957 -0.0947758 -0.2128834
Uganda 246.8273 675.1211 0.4003982 0.4431561 -0.1781921
Ukraine 1569.739 2016.01 0.2952543 -1.551573 0.170068 
United Arab Emirates 27256.29 39122.05 -0.0359611 -0.215564 0.955012 
43 
United Kingdom 19095.47 44472.15 0.1170177 -0.5175367 -0.2629595
United States 23954.48 56803.47 0.0033685 -0.4064458 -0.2608402
Uruguay 2989.991 15524.84 0.1219621 0.0732082 0.3916984 
Uzbekistan 651.4192 2137.577 0.1135504 0.9337683 -0.2095504
Venezuela, RB 2446.804 -1.17096 -0.21983 -0.7177974
Vietnam 94.8802 2065.169 0.0230937 -0.3395519 0.1421463 
Yemen 468.367 1693.908 0 -1.536711 -0.4226674
Zambia 409.258 1313.89 0.2521993 0.1177915 0.3761703 



















Example EKC with Turning Point
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